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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
In this appeal, we must resolve two issues. First, we 
consider whether the Eleventh Amendment bars suit 
against a county court, based on an alleged failure to 
provide interpretive services, where the judicial, but not all 
the administrative, functions of the court have been merged 
by steps into a unified state court system. Under the facts 
here, we hold that suit is not barred. Second, we review 
whether the District Court properly granted summary 
judgment, dismissing claims brought by a disabled inmate 
under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 
U.S.C. SS 12131-12135 ("ADA"), Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. S 794 ("Rehabilitation 
Act"), 42 U.S.C. S 1983 and the New Jersey Law Against 
Discrimination, N.J. Stat. S 10:5-4.1 (NJLAD). Because we 
conclude that there are genuine issues of material fact, we 
will reverse the granting of summary judgment by the 
District Court and remand this case for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
I. Factual and Procedural History 
 
A. Ronald Chisolm's Detention at the Mercer County 
       Detention Center 
 
On Saturday, September 10, 1994, while driving in 
Mercer County, New Jersey, Ronald Chisolm, a deaf person 
who communicates primarily through American Sign 
Language (ASL), was stopped by officers of the Princeton 
Police Department. The officers arrested Chisolm pursuant 
to a Bucks County, Pennsylvania, bench warrant. The 
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bench warrant was issued in 1990 because Chisolm failed 
to attend an intoxicated driver resource program. The 
program was required as part of his sentence following a 
1987 guilty plea to driving under the influence. After 
Chisolm's arrest, he was taken to the Mercer County 
Detention Center (MCDC) to await extradition to Bucks 
County. He was admitted to MCDC at 3:40 p.m on 
Saturday afternoon. 
 
MCDC, which has since closed, was a maximum security, 
pretrial detention facility located in Trenton, New Jersey. It 
housed detainees who were awaiting extradition to other 
states or were awaiting trial on indictable charges, ranging 
from murder to narcotics-related offenses. When inmates 
arrived at MCDC during the week, they were generally 
processed within a few hours. Processing occurred at the 
intake unit (4 North Living Unit) and involved a 
classification assessment to determine the inmate's security 
threat, custody status, and appropriate placement within 
MCDC. However, the MCDC's classification staff worked 
only Monday through Friday. On weekends, newly arrived 
detainees were "locked-down" in their cells either in the 4 
North Living Unit or in the Receiving and Discharge Unit 
(R&D) to keep them apart from the general inmate 
population before classification. These unclassified 
detainees consumed their meals in their cells and did not 
have television or telephone privileges. 
 
When Chisolm arrived at MCDC on Saturday afternoon, 
an MCDC employee attempted to interview him. Chisolm 
indicated to the employee that he was deaf and could not 
understand her. Chisolm then requested an ASL interpreter 
and a TDD.1 In addition, he asked that his hearing 
roommate, Kenneth Knight, be contacted. Chisolm 
contends that MCDC failed to provide the requested aids 
and failed to contact Knight. He also claims that MCDC did 
not provide him with any initial intake information, such as 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. A TDD is a machine that allows those with hearing disabilities to 
communicate with others by telephone. The TDD translates spoken 
words into written text for the deaf user. The deaf user then responds by 
typing his message into the TDD which transforms the typed message 
into spoken words. 
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the reason for his detention or the rules and regulations of 
the facility. 
 
Later that afternoon, Chisolm was taken to an MCDC 
nurse. Chisolm claims that he was upset, but, without an 
ASL interpreter, he could not explain why he was upset. 
MCDC asserts, however, that Chisolm was given paper and 
a pencil in order to communicate with MCDC personnel. 
The MCDC nurse conducted a medical evaluation of 
Chisolm and determined that he might be a suicide risk. 
MCDC contends that Chisolm's behavior caused concern 
that he might harm himself. 
 
Chisolm was kept in solitary lock down in cell 304 of 
R&D from Saturday, September 10, until Tuesday, 
September 13. During this time, he did not have access to 
a television set because there wasn't one in R&D. Moreover, 
pursuant to MCDC policies, Chisolm could not have access 
to a telephone until he was classified. 
 
On Monday, September 12, Chisolm was taken to penal 
counselor Jennifer Rubin for custody classification. Rubin 
gave him a numeric assessment of 10, which resulted in a 
custody classification of "medium."2  Notwithstanding the 
fact that Chisolm had worked for the U.S. Postal Service for 
13 years and had lived at the same address for 3 years, 
Rubin described him as an unemployed "vagrant." This 
error added 2 points to Chisolm's assessment, resulting in 
his medium custody classification. Without this error, 
Chisolm's custody classification would have been 
"minimum." 
 
Also on the morning of September 12, Warden 
McManimon informed another penal counselor, Donna 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. In processing and classifying Chisolm pursuant to MCDC policies, 
Rubin reviewed the following factors used to determine an inmate's 
custody status: 1) severity of the current offense; 2) assaultive offense 
history; 3) history of institutional violence; 4) any assaults occurring 
within the six months preceding detention; 5) disciplinary reports; 6) 
current detainer; 7) amount of bail; 8) inmate's sentence; 9) stability 
factor; and 10) inmate's employment status. For male inmates, a 
numeric assessment of 15 or more points resulted in maximum custody 
classification; 10-14 points resulted in medium custody classification; 
and 9 points or less resulted in minimum custody classification. 
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Walker, that a hearing impaired inmate had been admitted. 
Walker attempted to communicate with Chisolm through lip 
reading and writing notes. Chisolm asked Walker to contact 
Knight and again requested a TDD. Although MCDC did not 
have a TDD, Walker did contact Knight who brought 
Chisolm's own TDD to MCDC that same day. MCDC, 
however, had to log in and examine the TDD before 
releasing it to Chisolm. For that reason, Chisolm did not 
receive it until Tuesday, September 13. Because of his 
hearing disability and the failure of MCDC to provide him 
with a TDD, Chisolm was not able to use a telephone on 
Monday, September 12. 
 
On September 13, Chisolm was transferred to cell 24 of 
4 North Living Unit, where he remained until his discharge 
the next day. This unit had a television set equipped with 
closed captioning. Warden McManimon stated that if 
Chisolm wanted to have the closed captioning activated, 
Chisolm only needed to request the service. Chisolm 
contends, however, that he did not request closed 
captioning because he did not know that it was available. 
While in 4 North Living Unit, Chisolm was able to place 
telephone calls using his own TDD. MCDC did not impose 
its time limit of 15 minutes for telephone use on Chisolm 
because of the additional time necessary to type and read 
text on the TDD. 
 
B. Chisolm's Appearance Before the Mercer County 
       Vicinage 
 
On September 14, 1994, Chisolm was brought before the 
Mercer County Vicinage for an extradition hearing. There 
was no ASL interpreter present to aid Chisolm. For this 
reason, the judge postponed the extradition hearing and 
sent Chisolm back to MCDC. The hearing was rescheduled 
for September 20, which was the earliest date that the 
Vicinage's ASL interpreter was available. After his return to 
MCDC, Chisolm called Knight by TDD. Knight contacted an 
attorney, Clara Smit. 
 
Smit arranged to have an ASL interpreter available the 
next morning to interpret court proceedings. Smit also 
contacted the Bucks County District Attorney's office and 
had Chisolm's bench warrant quashed. Chisolm was then 
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released from MCDC that same day, and the court hearing 
was canceled. The parties agree that, but for the 
intervention by Smit, Chisolm's hearing would have been 
rescheduled for September 20. 
 
C. Relevant History of the Vicinage3 
 
The Vicinage originally was organized as one of many 
locally-funded county courts authorized under Article IV of 
the New Jersey Constitution. See N.J. Const. art.VI, S 4, 
P 1-5 (amended 1978). However, pursuant to constitutional 
amendments passed in 1978, 1983 and 1992, the Vicinage 
and other county courts have been merged gradually into 
New Jersey's state-based Superior Court system. See N.J. 
Assembly Concurrent Resolution No. 38 (filed July 25, 1978) 
(abolishing county courts); N.J. Assembly Concurrent 
Resolution No. 84 (filed Feb. 10, 1983) (authorizing the 
transition by which county court judges became New Jersey 
Superior Court Judges without nomination or 
confirmation); N.J. Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 58, 
1992 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. A-3 (West) (setting forth plan by 
which New Jersey became responsible for certain judicial 
costs and fees, and county judicial employees became 
employees of the State, on or before July 1, 1997). 
 
In connection with the transition from a county court 
system to a state court system and in order to implement 
the 1992 Amendment, the New Jersey legislature enacted 
the State Judicial Unification Act, N. J. Stat.SS 2B:10-1 to 
2B:10-9 (2001) (SJUA). Pursuant to the SJUA, the State of 
New Jersey assumed certain judicial costs and related 
liabilities of the Vicinage. See N.J. Stat.S 2B:10-7 (2001). 
Significantly, however, the Vicinage retained liability for 
"any tort claim . . . where the date of loss was prior to 
January 1, 1995." Id. at 2B:10-7(c)(2). Additionally, a New 
Jersey statute requires individual counties to provide 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. A history of the incorporation of New Jersey's county courts into its 
unified state court system is set forth in Board of Chosen Freeholders v. 
New Jersey, 732 A.2d 1053 (N.J. 1999). We will recite only that portion 
of this history relevant to our analysis of the sovereign immunity of the 
Vicinage. 
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necessary interpreting services for the hearing impaired in 
court proceedings. See id. at 2B:8-1.4 
 
D. Procedural History 
 
On March 6, 1995, Chisolm filed a complaint in United 
States District Court for the District of New Jersey against 
McManimon in his capacity as Warden of MCDC and 
against the Vicinage. He alleged that MCDC discriminated 
against him, while he was detained, by failing to provide 
him with an ASL interpreter, a TDD, and television 
captioning service, in violation of Title II of the ADA, Section 
504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 42 U.S.C. S 1983, and the 
NJLAD. He alleged that the Vicinage discriminated against 
him by failing to provide him with an ASL interpreter for his 
extradition hearing, when initially scheduled, in violation of 
the same statutes. Chisolm sought compensatory and 
punitive damages. 
 
On June 11, 1997, the District Court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the Vicinage on Chisolm's ADA, 
Rehabilitation Act, and 42 U.S.C. S 1983 claims, and 
dismissed the NJLAD claim for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction. See Chisolm v. Manimon, Civ. No. 95-0991 (D. 
N.J. filed Jun. 11, 1997).5 The District Court held that 
Chisolm's ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims must fail 
because he was never excluded from a program by reason 
of his disability, i.e., his extradition hearing never occurred. 
 
The District Court also raised sua sponte the issue of the 
Vicinage's sovereign immunity under the Eleventh 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. Finding that 
Congress validly abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment 
immunity in enacting Title II of the ADA, the District Court 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. After the judicial unification, Section 2B:8-1 was amended to clarify 
that "interpreting services" included interpreters for the hearing 
impaired. See 1995 N.J. Laws c. 98, S 1 (effective May 9, 1995). The 
statute does not, however, require the state to pay for these services. 
See 
id. Significantly, responsibility for providing interpreters was kept with 
the counties. See N.J. Stat. S 2B:8-1 (2001). 
 
5. The case was captioned improperly as "Ronald Chisolm v. Patrick 
Manimon, Jr." In this opinion, we use the proper spelling of the warden's 
name, "McManimon." 
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ruled that the Vicinage was not immune from Chisolm's 
suit. 
 
On May 18, 2000, the District Court granted summary 
judgment for MCDC (McManimon in his official capacity) on 
Chisolm's ADA, Rehabilitation Act and NJLAD claims and 
dismissed all of Chisolm's claims.6 Chisolm v. Manimon, 97 
F.Supp.2d 615 (D. N.J. 2000). The court concluded that 
"any rational trier of fact would find that reasonable 
accommodations were provided to Chisolm by defendant, 
and that any requested accommodations which were not 
provided . . . would not have been reasonable in the setting 
of a correctional institution." Id. 
 
Chisolm timely appealed. 
 
II Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction over this case 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1331. We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
We exercise plenary review over the grant of summary 
judgment, applying the same standard that the lower court 
should have applied. See Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 
206 F.3d 271, 278 (3d Cir. 2000). Summary judgment is 
appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Facts 
are "material" if they could affect the outcome of the suit 
under the governing substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 
202 (1986). We must view the facts in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party, see Matsushita Elec. 
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 
S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986), and must draw"all 




6. The court also granted summary judgment in favor of MCDC on 
Chisolm's Section 1983 claim, finding no facts supporting a procedural 
due process claim. 
 





A. Sovereign Immunity of the Vicinage 
 
Before turning to the merits of Chisolm's claims against 
MCDC and the Vicinage, we must address whether, under 
the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the 
Vicinage is immune from Chisolm's suit. Having raised the 
issue sua sponte, the District Court held that the Vicinage 
did not enjoy Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. 
Although we reach the same conclusion as the District 
Court, we do so for different reasons.7  Specifically, we hold 
that the Vicinage cannot assert sovereign immunity in this 
case because at the time of the actions giving rise to this 
suit and at the time this suit was brought, the Vicinage did 
not qualify as an entity that is an arm of the state. So 
holding, we need not address (1) whether the Vicinage 
waived the immunity defense by its conduct in litigation or 
(2) whether Congress validly abrogated Eleventh 
Amendment immunity when enacting Title II of the ADA. 
 
The Eleventh Amendment provides: 
 
       The Judicial power of the United States shall not be 
       construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The District Court concluded that Congress had abrogated Eleventh 
Amendment immunity with respect to suits arising out of the ADA and 
the Rehabilitation Act. See id. at 4-10. See also Seminole Tribe of 
Florida 
v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996) (setting forth the test by which a 
court 
must determine whether Congress has abrogated the states' sovereign 
immunity from suit). 
 
After the District Court decided the immunity issue, the United States 
Supreme Court held that Congress did not abrogate the states' sovereign 
immunity by enacting Title I of the ADA in Board of Trustees of the 
University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); see also Lavia v. 
Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections, 224 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding 
that Congress did not validly abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment 
sovereign immunity from suit under ADA's Title I). Significantly, 
however, the Garrett Court did not address whether Congress abrogated 
Eleventh Amendment immunity in the context of suits brought under 
Title II of the ADA. See id. at 960 n.1 (noting a split among the Courts 
of Appeals on this issue but declining to resolve the split without the 
benefit of briefing). Accordingly, the District Court's opinion is not 
invalidated expressly by Garrett. 
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       commenced or prosecuted against one of the United 
       States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or 
       Subjects of any Foreign State. 
 
U.S. Const. amend. XI. The Supreme Court has interpreted 
the Eleventh Amendment to provide each state with 
immunity not only from suits brought by citizens of other 
states, but also from suits brought by its own citizens. See, 
e.g., Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
 
While Eleventh Amendment immunity may be available 
for states, its protections do not extend to counties. See 
Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890). Rather, for 
Eleventh Amendment immunity to apply, a court must 
determine that a state is a real party-in-interest. See, e.g., 
Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of Indiana , 323 
U.S. 459, 464 (1945). Accordingly, Eleventh Amendment 
immunity will not be available to a state merely by virtue of 
the fact that such state is named formally as a defendant. 
See, e.g., Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 500 (1921) ("As 
to what is to be deemed a suit against a State, . . . it is now 
established that the question is to be determined not by the 
mere names of the titular parties but by the essential 
nature and effect of the proceeding, as it appears from the 
entire record."). Conversely, Eleventh Amendment immunity 
may be available to a state party-in-interest 
notwithstanding a claimant's failure to formally name the 
state as a defendant. See, e.g., Monell v. New York City 
Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978); Ford Motor, 
323 U.S. at 464. 
 
In determining whether an entity is an arm of the state 
and, therefore, entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, 
we consider the following three factors: (1) whether 
payment of a judgment resulting from the suit would come 
from the state treasury, (2) the status of the entity under 
state law, and (3) the entity's degree of autonomy. See 
Fitchik v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc. , 873 F.2d 
655, 659 (3d Cir. 1989) (en banc). A party asserting 
Eleventh Amendment immunity bears the burden of 
proving its applicability. See Christy v. Pennsylvania 
Turnpike Comm'n, 54 F.3d 1140, 1144 (3d Cir. 1995). 
Although no single factor is dispositive, we have often held 
that the most important factor is whether a judgment 
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resulting from the suit would be paid from the state 
treasury. See, e.g., Carter v. City of Philadelphia, 181 F.3d 
339 (3d Cir. 1999); Christy, 54 F. 3d at 1140; Fitchik, 873 
F.2d at 659-660. We conclude that the Vicinage has not 
met its burden of demonstrating entitlement to Eleventh 
Amendment immunity. Specifically, the Vicinage has not 
proved that it is an arm of the state under the Fitchik 
factors. 
 
Application of the Fitchik factors to the Vicinage must be 
viewed in the context of the unification of the New Jersey 
court system. The events giving rise to Chisolm's suit 
against the Vicinage, as well as the filing of the suit itself, 
transpired during the Vicinage's transition from a county 
court to a state court. The extent to which the Vicinage may 
be considered an arm of the state -- as opposed to a county 
entity -- is complicated by this transition. We conclude that 
under the circumstances of this case, the Vicinage was not 
acting as an "arm of the state" under Fitchik.8 
 
Section 2B:10-7(c)(2) of the SJUA directly addresses the 
first of the three Fitchik factors: whether a judgment would 
be paid out of the state treasury. Chisolm's claims against 
the Vicinage, brought in March 1995 as a result of the 
alleged discrimination during September 1994, clearly were 
tort claims for which the date of loss pre-dated January 1, 
1995. Section 2B:10-7(c)(2) expressly provides that, even 
after the transition of the Vicinage to a state court, any 
such claims were the liabilities of Mercer County. Because 
Mercer County -- and not the State of New Jersey-- would 
satisfy any judgment entered for Chisolm, the "funding 
factor" weighs heavily against the Vicinage's assertion of 
sovereign immunity. 
 
With respect to the second Fitchik factor, status under 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The Vicinage's transition from a county entity to a state entity raises 
another interesting question: At what time must a defendant be an "arm 
of the state" in order to be eligible for Eleventh Amendment immunity? 
Should we apply the Fitchik factors to the Vicinage as of the time of 
Chisolm's alleged injury in September 1994 or as of the time Chisolm 
brought suit in March 1995? Because we find that the Vicinage was not 
an "arm of the state" under Fitchik at either of these times, we need not 
resolve this question here. 
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state law, our analysis is more difficult. Since the state 
takeover of administrative authority and responsibility for 
the unified, state-based court system on January 1, 1995, 
state law generally has treated the Vicinage as a state 
entity. Indeed, the New Jersey Constitution provides that 
the Superior Court is the state's trial court of original 
jurisdiction and that the Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court is the administrative head of all courts within the 
state. See N.J. Const. Art. VI, S7, P 1. These facts seem to 
suggest that the Vicinage's status under state law changed 
from a county entity to a state entity in connection with the 
judicial unification. On the other hand, the Vicinage was 
funded, administered and operated by Mercer County at the 
time of the alleged discrimination. See N.J. Stat. S 2B:10-2 
(2001) (describing county administration of county courts 
prior to the enactment of the SJUA). More importantly, New 
Jersey state statutes continue to make the counties 
responsible for providing interpretive services. See id. at 
2B:8-1. 
 
From the above we can see that the Vicinage performs 
different functions, judicial and administrative, in different 
capacities. The Vicinage has performed many of its judicial 
functions in its capacity as a state entity under New Jersey 
law. However, when the Vicinage provides, or fails to 
provide, interpretive services, it performs, or fails to 
perform, a function which is the administrative 
responsibility of a county under New Jersey law. When we 
apply the second Fitchik factor, we must consider the 
capacity in which the entity was acting when its actions 
gave rise to the plaintiff 's claim. See Carter v. City of 
Philadelphia, 181 F.3d at 353 (holding that although a 
district attorney may be deemed a state actor with regard to 
prosecutorial functions, she was a local policymaker with 
respect to administrative matters). Because Chisolm's claim 
against the Vicinage is based on its failure to provide 
interpretive services, this suit relates to the Vicinage's 
function as a county entity under state law. Accordingly, 
the second factor also weighs against the Vicinage's claim 
of sovereign immunity. 
 
The third and final Fitchik factor is the Vicinage's degree 
of autonomy. According to the New Jersey Constitution, 
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Superior Court judges are nominated and appointed by the 
Governor with the consent and advice of the state senate. 
See N.J. Const. Art. VI, S 6, P 1. As such, the court is an 
independent branch of New Jersey's state government. The 
Vicinage's degree of autonomy is mitigated somewhat by the 
state's assumption of certain costs and liabilities of county 
government in connection with the SJUA. See N.J. Stat. 
SS 2B:10-1 et seq. (2001). However, because the county is 
charged by law to provide interpretive services, and is not 
regulated by the state in performing this function, the 
Vicinage was autonomous in respect to the conduct which 
is the basis for Chisolm's claim. See Carter v. City of 
Philadelphia, 181 F.3d at 352 (distinguishing between 
district attorney's state prosecutorial and county 
managerial functions) 
 
Balancing the Fitchik factors discussed above, we 
conclude that the Vicinage was not acting as an"arm of the 
state" either at the time of the alleged discrimination or at 
the time that the suit against it was filed. For these 
reasons, we conclude that Chisolm's suit against the 
Vicinage is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 
 
B. Review of Summary Judgment 
 
We turn now to our consideration of the propriety of 
granting summary judgment in favor of MCDC and the 
Vicinage. Title II of the ADA provides that "no qualified 
individual with a disability shall, by reason of such 
disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied 
the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a 
public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such 
entity. 42 U.S.C. S 12132.9 Regulations promulgated by the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The Rehabilitation Act provides that a qualified disabled person shall 
not, "solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance. . . ." 29 U.S.C. 794(a) (2001). The NJLAD provides that "[a]ll 
persons shall have the opportunity to obtain . . . all the 
accommodations, advantages . . . and privileges of any place of public 
accommodation" without discrimination on the basis of disability. N.J. 
Stat. Ann.S S 10:5-4, 10:5-4.1. 
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United States Attorney General require that public entities 
take certain pro-active measures to avoid the 
discrimination proscribed by Title II. See id.  at 12134(a) 
(directing the Attorney General to promulgate regulations 
necessary to implement Title II); 28 C.F.R. SS 35.101 et seq. 
(1991). Furthermore, we have held that: 
 
       Because Title II was enacted with broad language and 
       directed the Department of Justice to promulgate 
       regulations as set forth above, the regulations  which 
       the Department promulgated are entitled to substantial 
       deference. Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132, 141, 102 S.Ct. 
       2355, 2361, 72 L.Ed.2d 728 (1982). ("[T]he 
       interpretation of [the] agency charged with the 
       administration of [this] statute is entitled to substantial 
       deference."). 
 
Helen L., 46 F.3d at 331-32 (emphasis added). 
 
Appellees do not dispute that Chisolm is a qualified 
individual with a disability. Moreover, the fact that he was 
imprisoned at the time of the alleged discrimination does 
not preclude him from receiving the benefits of the ADA. 
Title II of the ADA applies to services, programs and 
activities provided within correctional institutions. See 
Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206 
(1998). We must determine, therefore, whether, in light of 
the regulations promulgated by the Attorney General, there 
are issues of material fact as to whether MCDC and the 




We have recognized that law developed under the Rehabilitation Act is 
applicable to Title II of the ADA, see Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 
330-31 & n.7 (3d Cir. 1995), and that Congress has directed that Title 
II of the ADA be interpreted to be consistent with the Rehabilitation Act. 
See Yeskey v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections, 118 
F.3d 168, 170 (3d. Cir. 1997). Moreover, New Jersey courts typically look 
to federal anti-discrimination law in construing NJLAD. Lawrence v. Nat'l 
Westminster Bank New Jersey, 98 F.3d 61, 70 (3d Cir. 1996). Therefore, 
we will confine our discussion to the ADA with the understanding that 
the principles will apply equally to the Rehabilitation Act and NJLAD 
claims. 
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       1. Title II Regulations Applicable to MCDC and the 
       Vicinage 
 
Generally, regulations require public entities to take 
"appropriate steps" to ensure that communication with a 
disabled person is as effective as communication with 
others. 28 C.F.R. S 35.160(a). Furthermore,"[w]here 
necessary to afford an individual with a disability an equal 
opportunity to participate in, and enjoy the benefits of, a 
service, program, or activity," a public entity must furnish 
"appropriate auxiliary aids and services." Id. at 
35.160(b)(1). 
 
The lone regulatory limitation on this duty is embodied in 
Section 35.164 of the subpart. Section 35.164 provides that 
a public entity may be relieved of its duty only upon 
proving that, considering all funding and operating 
resources available, the proposed action would result in 
either (1) a fundamental alteration in the nature of the 
service, program or activity or (2) undue financial or 
administrative burdens. To qualify for the Section 35.164 
exemption, a public entity must provide a written statement 
explaining its conclusions. A public entity claiming the 
exemption must also take alternative action not resulting in 
such an alteration or burden, but nevertheless ensuring, to 
the maximum extent possible, that disabled individuals 
receive the public entity's benefits and/or services. 
 
"In determining what type of auxiliary aid and service is 
necessary, a public entity shall give primary consideration 
to the requests of the individual with disabilities." Id. at 
35.160(b)(2).10 For deaf and hearing-impaired persons, 
auxiliary aids and services include: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. That a public entity must give preference to a disabled person's 
choice of auxiliary aid over an alternative is echoed in the Appendix to 
the regulations. In relevant part, the Appendix provides: 
 
       [t]he public entity must provide an opportunity for individuals 
with 
       disabilities to request the auxiliary aids and services of their 
choice. 
       This expressed choice shall be given primary consideration by the 
       public entity (S 35.160(b)(2)). The public entity shall honor the 
choice 
       unless it can demonstrate that another effective means of 
       communication exists or that use of the means chosen would not be 
       required under S 35.164. Deference to the request of the individual 
       with a disability is desirable because of the range of 
disabilities, the 
       variety of auxiliary aids and services, and different circumstances 
       requiring effective communication. 
 
28 C.F.R. Pt. 35, App. A (emphasis added). 
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       Qualified interpreters, notetakers, transcription 
       services, written materials, telephone handset 
       amplifiers, assistive listening devices, assistive listening 
       systems, telephones compatible with hearing aids, 
       closed caption decoders, open and closed captioning, 
       telecommunications devices for deaf persons (TDD's), 
       videotext displays, or other effective methods of making 
       aurally delivered materials available to individuals with 
       hearing impairments. 
 
28 C.F.R. S 35.104(1). The Appendix to the regulations 
explains that: 
 
       [A]lthough in some circumstances a notepad and 
       written materials may be sufficient to permit effective 
       communication, in other circumstances they may not 
       be sufficient. For example, a qualified interpreter may 
       be necessary when the information being 
       communicated is complex, or is exchanged for a 
       lengthy period of time. Generally, factors to be 
       considered in determining whether an interpreter is 
       required include the context in which the 
       communication is taking place, the number of people 
       involved, and the importance of the communication. 
 
28 C.F.R. Pt. 35, App. A. 
 
       2. MCDC 
 
Chisolm argues that MCDC discriminated against him on 
the basis of his disability on three separate occasions. First, 
Chisolm claims that MCDC violated Title II of the ADA, the 
Rehabilitation Act, and the NJLAD when it failed to provide 
him with an ASL interpreter during its intake procedure 
and medical evaluation. Chisolm alleges that this failure 
deprived him of basic intake information including the 
reason for his detention and the rules and regulations of 
MCDC. Further, Chisolm claims that the failure to provide 
an ASL interpreter during his intake and evaluation 
resulted in his receiving inappropriate classifications. The 
second basis for Chisolm's claim against MCDC arises out 
of MCDC's failure to provide Chisolm with a TDD device. 
According to Chisolm, this failure denied him the privilege 
of placing telephone calls enjoyed by similarly situated 
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inmates without hearing disabilities. Finally, Chisolm 
claims that MCDC's failure to activate closed captioning 
capabilities available on a prison television discriminated 
against him. 
 
MCDC has asserted that, in reviewing Chislom's claims, 
we must consider the necessity of providing a particular 
auxiliary aid or service in light of the prison setting. Citing 
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), MCDC contends that 
courts must defer to prison management decisions, 
specifically with respect to security.11  But see Yeskey v. 
Penna. Dept. of Corrections, 118 F.3d 168, 174-75 & n. 8 
(3d Cir. 1997) (declining to decide "the controversial and 
difficult question" of whether the Turner standard for 
judicial deference should be applied to statutory as well as 
constitutional claims), aff 'd on other grounds, 524 U.S. 206 
(1998). Although at least one court has adopted the Turner 
test for judicial deference to prison management decisions 
in the ADA context, see Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439, 
1446-1447 (9th Cir. 1994), we need not reach the issue 
here. MCDC's repetition of the word "security" in its brief 
and general references to "security" issues in the warden's 
deposition are not supported by any showing that"security" 
in fact is implicated in making available to an inmate at 
appropriate times the services and aids that Chisolm 
requested. 
 
MCDC also contends generally, and the District Court 
found as a matter of law, that because Chisolm was 
incarcerated for only four days, MCDC was not obligated to 
provide aids or services applicable in cases involving "longer 
term" inmates. See e.g., Duffy, 98 F.3d at 455 (involving a 
deaf inmate incarcerated for over ten years); Clarkson v. 
Coughlin, 898 F. Supp. 1019, 1045-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) 
(finding that long term state inmates were entitled to sign- 
language interpreters for reception, testing, and 
classification process resulting in permanent assignments 
to prisons). However, MCDC does not cite any regulation, 
statute or case either distinguishing between the needs of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. To support this proposition, MCDC also cites Inmates of Allegheny 
County Jail v. Wecht, 93 F.3d 1124, 1136 (3d Cir. 1996), 
notwithstanding the fact that the opinion was vacated. See id. at 1146. 
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short term and long term inmates or suggesting that short 
term facilities are exempted from compliance with Title II. 
Furthermore, we have been unable to locate any such 
authority. The length of Chisolm's detention may impact a 
factfinder's determination of whether MCDC discriminated 
in violation of the regulations promulgated under the ADA. 
However, a facility such as MCDC that houses detainees for 
an average of 60 days is not excluded automatically from 
Title II of the ADA. We see no basis then to recognize as a 
matter of law any distinction regarding the appropriateness 
of an auxiliary aid or service based upon the duration of an 
ADA claimant-inmate's detention. 
 
In addition, with respect to the first two bases of 
Chisolm's claim, the failure to provide an ASL interpreter 
and the failure to promptly provide a TDD, MCDC argues 
that it employed alternative but effective auxiliary aids. The 
most obvious problem with this argument is that it conflicts 
with the regulatory mandate that a public entity honor a 
disabled person's choice of auxiliary aid or service. See 28 
C.F.R. Pt. 35, App. A. Accordingly, to support the District 
Court's grant of summary judgment with respect to these 
two bases, the record must show that either (1) the 
alternative aid and/or service provided was effective or (2) 
provision of the requested aid and/or service would not be 
required under Section 35.164. See id. 
 
Generally, the effectiveness of auxiliary aids and/or 
services is a question of fact precluding summary 
judgment. Compare Randolph v. Rodgers, 170 F.3d 850, 
860 (8th Cir 1999) (reversing grant of summary judgment 
to deaf inmate because whether provision of a sign 
language interpreter during disciplinary hearing was an 
appropriate auxiliary aid was a fact question) and Duffy v. 
Riveland, 98 F.3d 447, 454, 455 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding 
that the qualifications of an interpreter and the deaf 
inmate's ability to communicate in prison disciplinary 
hearing were fact questions precluding summary judgment) 
with McGregor v. Louisiana State Univ. Bd. of Supervisors, 
3 F.3d 850, 855 (5th Cir. 1993) (granting summary 
judgment to defendant law school, despite questions of fact 
as to requested aid, because requested aid would 
fundamentally modify program). As discussed more 
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particularly below, Chisolm has presented evidence 
sufficient to raise genuine issues of material fact regarding 
the effectiveness of the alternative aids provided by MCDC. 
 
Nor does the record suggest that MCDC is exempted 
under 28 C.F.R. S 35.164 from the regulatory obligation to 
provide a requested auxiliary aid and/or service. MCDC 
argues that providing Chisolm with an ASL interpreter and 
TDD would have caused either undue burden to or 
fundamental alteration of MCDC. However, it is not clear 
from the record that MCDC complied with the requirements 
of Section 35.164. Specifically, there is no indication that 
MCDC issued written statements of its reasons for denying 
Chisolm's requested auxiliary aids. See 28 C.F.R. S 35.164 
(2001). Additionally, whether the alternative aids protected 
Chisolm's interests "to the maximum extent possible" 
without unduly burdening MCDC or fundamentally altering 
its programs presents an unresolved question of fact. Id. 
 
Having addressed the general arguments raised by MCDC 
in response to Chisolm's claim, we now turn to MCDC's 
specific responses to the individual bases of Chisolm's 
claim. 
 
       a. Failure to Provide an ASL Interpreter 
 
Chisolm claims that MCDC violated Title II of the ADA 
when it failed to provide him with an ASL interpreter during 
his intake and classification. That MCDC did, in fact, fail to 
provide Chisolm with an ASL interpreter is not in dispute. 
However, MCDC responds to this claim by suggesting that 
its personnel were able to communicate with Chisolm 
effectively by lipreading and writing on a pad of paper. 
 
In determining that MCDC demonstrated the 
effectiveness of these alternative auxiliary aids provided to 
Chisolm, the District Court did not resolve all reasonable 
factual inferences in favor of Chisolm, the non-moving 
party. Chisolm presented evidence indicating that ASL was 
his primary language of communication and that he was 
not proficient in either lipreading or written English.12 From 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. The parties do not dispute that Chisolm communicates primarily 
through ASL. According to his unrebutted expert report, Chisolm's 
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this evidence, a reasonable trier of fact could infer that 
these alternative aids were ineffective. Indeed, the 
erroneous classification of Chisolm as an unemployed 
vagrant creates a reasonable inference that the 
communication aids employed by MCDC were not, in fact, 
effective. 
 
In support of its conclusion that the combination of 
lipreading and note writing was an effective auxiliary aid, 
MCDC cites to a single statement made by Chisolm during 
a deposition. In this statement, Chisolm confirms that the 
MCDC personnel with whom he was communicating did 
everything that he requested in writing. Id. While this 
statement may influence a trier of fact's assessment of 
whether the pad of paper and pencil were effective auxiliary 
aids, it does not show their effectiveness as a matter of law. 
Necessarily, Chisolm's ability to make written requests was 
dependent upon his ability to write in English. When 
considered in a light most favorable to Chisolm and 
together with the evidence that Chisolm is not proficient in 
written English, the deposition statement is not dispositive 
of the issue of effectiveness. 
 
Finally, there is no indication in the record that, under 
Section 35.164, MCDC was exempt from the requirement to 
provide Chisolm with an ASL interpreter. MCDC argues 
that allowing an ASL interpreter "onto the living unit" of 
MCDC would conflict with safety and security concerns 
regarding the "orderly function of MCDC." Safety and 
security concerns likely were implicated by Chisolm's 
request for an ASL interpreter. Nevertheless, by suggesting 
that an ASL interpreter would be placed "onto the living 
unit," MCDC interprets Chisolm's request as an extremely 
broad one. Factual issues exist as to whether MCDC could 
have provided an ASL interpreter at critical points, 
including intake, medical evaluations, and classification, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
lipreading skills are "extremely limited" and he misinterprets unexpected 
utterances as expected ones. The report also notes that his written 
English "exhibits characteristics of an partially learned second 
language." Similarly, his ability to read English is limited by his poor 
mastery of grammar and vocabulary. 
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while still taking into account legitimate safety and security 
concerns. 
 
       b. Failure to Provide a TDD 
 
MCDC also resists Chisolm's claim that MCDC unlawfully 
discriminated against him by failing to promptly provide 
him with access to a TDD. To the extent that other, non- 
disabled inmates had access to communication by 
telephone, MCDC was required to provide Chisolm with 
such access on nondiscriminatory terms. See 42 U.S.C. 
S 12132. Both Chisolm and his roommate, Kenneth Knight, 
requested that a TDD be provided as an auxiliary aid. 
Nevertheless, MCDC cites safety concerns as justifying its 
failure to promptly provide a TDD and suggests that it 
provided alternative, but effective, auxiliary aids. The 
District Court found MCDC's refusal to promptly provide a 
TDD "reasonable" as a matter of law. Chisolm, 97 
F.Supp.2d at 623-24. However, in reaching this conclusion, 
the District Court resolved various factual disputes against 
Chisolm. 
 
Citing McManimon's affidavit, MCDC argues that a TDD 
machine and/or its constituent parts could be used as a 
weapon and that Chisolm would pose a security risk if 
allowed "unrestricted access to his TTD on the living unit." 
Like MCDC's broad characterization of Chisolm's request 
for an ASL interpreter, this statement may overstate the 
safety or security threat posed by Chisolm's request for an 
auxiliary aid. It is not clear that Chisolm requested -- or 
would have needed -- "unrestricted" access to a TDD. 
Furthermore, we do not know whether this auxiliary aid 
could have been provided somewhere other than "on the 
living unit." Chisolm argues that he merely wanted access 
to a TDD so that he could place calls like other detainees. 
 
In lieu of providing Chisolm with his choice of auxiliary 
aid upon request, MCDC made two exceptions to its 
institutional rules in an effort to accommodate Chisolm's 
needs. First, MCDC permitted Donna Walker to place a 
telephone call to Knight on Chisolm's behalf. Second, after 
Chisolm was provided with an TDD, MCDC allowed 
Chisolm to place calls in excess of the usual fifteen minute 
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limit to account for the delays associated with typing into 
a TDD. The District Court found as a matter of law that 
these alternative concessions made by MCDC in lieu of 
providing Chisolm with a TDD were "reasonable" in light of 
safety and security concerns in the prison setting. Chisolm, 
97 F.Supp.2d at 623-24. However, in so finding, the 
District Court once again resolved factual disputes against 
Chisolm. Chisolm's contention that he "could not contact 
his attorney, friends, or family" for lack of a TDD raises a 
reasonable factual inference that MCDC's alternative aids 
were not effective. Furthermore, there is no indication that 
MCDC complied with the requirements of Section 35.164 
when it refused to promptly provide Chisolm with a TDD. 
 
       c. Failure to Activate Closed Captioning 
 
In response to Chisolm's claim that MCDC discriminated 
against him when it failed to activate closed captioning on 
a prison television, both MCDC and the District Court note 
that Chisolm failed to request closed captioning. Citing 
Randolph, 170 F.3d at 858, the District Court and MCDC 
maintain that MCDC had no obligation to activate the 
closed captioning absent a specific request from Chisolm. 
 
This analysis is flawed for three reasons. First, there is 
no evidence that Chisolm knew that closed captioning 
services were available. Second, even if we did adopt the 
Eighth Circuit's Randolph rule, cited by the District Court, 
it would be inapplicable if MCDC had knowledge of 
Chisolm's hearing disability but failed to discuss related 
issues with him. See Randolph, 170 F.3d at 858-59 ("While 
it is true that public entities are not required to guess at 
what accommodations they should provide, the requirement 
does not narrow the ADA or RA so much that the [public 
entity] may claim [the disabled person] failed to request an 
accommodation when it declined to discuss the issue with 
him."). Finally, the adequacy of MCDC's communication 
with Chisolm lies unresolved at the heart of this case. As 
such, whether Chisolm even could have communicated a 
request for closed captioning presents a question of fact 
that has not yet been resolved. 
 
For the above reasons, we conclude that the District 
Court improperly granted summary judgment in favor of 
McManimon. 
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       3. The Vicinage 
 
Chisolm argues that the Vicinage discriminated against 
him when it failed to arrange for and provide an ASL 
interpreter for his scheduled extradition hearing on 
September 14, 1994. Chisolm argues that by postponing 
the hearing until an ASL interpreter was available and 
remanding Chisolm to MCDC, the Vicinage injured him in 
connection with the alleged discrimination. For the reasons 
stated below, we hold that the District Court erred in 
granting summary judgment in favor of the Vicinage with 
respect to this claim. 
 
The District Court granted summary judgment to the 
Vicinage reasoning that, because no extradition hearing 
was held, the Vicinage did not exclude Chisolm from any 
programs. See Chisolm, Civ. No. 95-0991 at 12. This 
conclusion ignores the broad language of the statutes 
under which Chisolm brings his claims against the 
Vicinage. Without showing that the Vicinage excluded him 
from an extradition hearing, Chisolm may bring his claim 
under the theory that the Vicinage denied him an 
extradition hearing. See 42 U.S.C. S 12132. Furthermore, 
each of the relevant statutes, Title II of the ADA, the 
Rehabilitation Act, and the NJLAD, proscribes 
discrimination on the basis of disability without requiring 
exclusion per se. See id. ("[N]o qualified individual with a 
disability shall, by reason of such disability . . . be 
subjected to discrimination by any [public] entity."); 29 
U.S.C. S 794(a) (providing that a qualified disabled person 
shall not, "solely by reason of her or his disability . . . be 
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity 
receiving Federal financial assistance"); N.J. Stat. S 10:5-4.1 
("All of the provisions of the act . . . shall be construed to 
prohibit any unlawful discrimination against any person 
because such person is or has been at any time 
handicapped . . . ."). The record, when viewed in a light 
most favorable to Chisolm, raises a genuine issue as to 
whether or not the Vicinage either discriminated against 
Chisolm on the basis of his disability or otherwise denied 
him the benefits of an activity, program or service. 
 
The District Court found, and we agree, that extradition 
hearings are "programs" within the definition of the ADA 
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and the Rehabilitation Act. See Chisolm, Civ. No. 95-0991 
at 12, n.7 (citing Duffy, 98 F.3d at 455). A reasonable trier 
of fact could find that the Vicinage denied Chisolm the 
ability to participate in an extradition hearing to the same 
extent non-disabled individuals are able to participate. The 
Vicinage does not dispute that Chisolm's extradition 
hearing would have occurred as scheduled on September 
14, 1994, were it not for Chisolm's inability to communicate 
without an auxiliary aid and/or service. Therefore, Chisolm 
faced an additional six days of incarceration solely because 
of the Vicinage's inability to provide him with an auxiliary 
aid or service at his scheduled extradition hearing. 
 
The Vicinage argues that its "affirmative measures" to 
locate an ASL interpreter, in fact, "complied fully with" the 
regulations. However, it is up to the trier of fact to 
determine whether the Vicinage provided a sufficient 
auxiliary aid and/or service when it rescheduled Chisolm's 
hearing and ordered him remanded into custody for a 
further six days until an ASL interpreter could be present. 
See Randolph, 170 F.3d at 859; Duffy, 98 F.3d at 455-56. 
 
The Vicinage also argues that the failure to provide an 
auxiliary aid and/or service upon Chisolm's scheduled 
extradition hearing was justified because the Vicinage 
lacked notice of Chisolm's disability. Although not expressly 
framed as such, this argument appears to invoke the 
Section 35.164 exception to the general rule that a public 
entity must provide a disabled individual with a requested 
auxiliary aid and/or service. Section 35.164 exempts public 
entities from providing a requested aid or service only if 
doing so would cause a "fundamental alteration" to the 
entity's programs or would create undue financial or 
administrative burdens. 28 C.F.R. S 35.164. Providing 
Chisolm with an ASL interpreter would not fundamentally 
alter the extradition hearing, as is evidenced by the fact 
that a New Jersey statute expressly mandates this service. 
See id.; N.J. Stat. 2B:8-1 (2001). Therefore, the Vicinage 
could avoid providing Chisolm with an ASL interpreter only 
if doing so would create "undue financial and 
administrative burdens." 28 C.F.R. S 35.164. 
 
Assuming arguendo that it would have been unduly 
burdensome for the Vicinage to provide Chisolm with an 
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ASL interpreter on such short notice, it is not clear from 
the record that the Vicinage complied with Section 35.164. 
Specifically, there is no indication that the Vicinage issued 
a written statement of its reasons for denying Chisolm's 
requested auxiliary service. Additionally, whether 
remanding Chisolm into custody for six additional days 
ensured Chisolm's access to an extradition hearing"to the 
maximum extent possible" without unduly burdening the 
Vicinage is an unresolved question of fact. 
 
Moreover, to the extent that the Vicinage argues a"lack 
of notice" of Chisolm's disability, that lack of notice may 
demonstrate a failure of the Vicinage to discharge its 
statutory responsibility of providing interpretive services for 
the deaf. The provision of such services must include some 




We conclude that, for purposes of determining whether 
the Vicinage may assert sovereign immunity, it was not 
acting as an "arm of the state." Therefore, the Eleventh 
Amendment to the United States Constitution does not 
provide the Vicinage with immunity from Chisolm's suit. 
 
As for summary judgment, Chisolm has demonstrated 
that genuine issues of material fact remain for trial. Thus, 
the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor 
of defendants. We will reverse the judgments in favor of 
McManimon and the Vicinage and remand this case to the 
District Court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
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